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Changes in Income Distribution in Poor 
Agricultural Nations: Malax i and Madagascar* 
Frederic L. Pryor 
Swarthmore College 
Introduction 
MalaWi (formerly Nyasaland) and Madagascar are poor, agricultural 
nations in southern Africa that have chosen very different strategies of 
development. Mala i carries a "capitalist" label and has focused its 
governmental development efforts on the agricultural sector up to the 
early 1980s; Madagascar carries a "Marxist" label and, in the decade 
from 1975 to 1985, has chosen to direct its major attention to the 
industrial sector. In some respects, the economic performance of the 
two nations has been very different: for instance, between 1960 and 
1986, Mala i had an average annual increase of per capita GDP of 
about 1.6%, while Madagascar had an average annual decrease of 
about 1.1%. In other respects, performance was relatively similar. For 
instance, both countries experienced widening differentials of income 
and increasing poverty, but especially Malaci. 
In poor agricultural nations, an increasing inequality in the distri- 
bution of income for the nation as a whole can come about for three 
2 
reasons. 
1. The income inequalities within the urban or rural sectors wid- 
en. As shown below, the greater income differentials in the rural sec- 
tors of the two countries were the most important factors underlying 
the overall increasing inequalities of income. 
2. The relative number of families increases in the urban sector 
(as long as the urban sector accounts for less than half of the popula- 
tion), where average incomes are higher. Although such a population 
movement occurred to a limited extent in both countries, it did not 
have an important impact on the overall distribution of income. 
3. The disparity in average incomes of families in the urban and 
rural sectors widens. In both MalaWi and Madagascar, however, this 
? 1990 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 
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24 Economic Development and Cultural Change 
disparity narrowed, primarily because real family incomes in the urban 
sector fell considerably. 
In this article I examine the available income distribution data, 
then turn to the policy variables underlying the intrasectoral and in- 
tersectoral income differences, and finally focus on some physical indi- 
cators of poverty in order to explore what happened to incomes at one 
end of the income distribution. 
Basic Trends in the Income Distribution 
The tentative nature of data presented below must always be kept in 
mind; the estimates are pieced together from a variety of surveys of 
family income in different sectors at different times, adjusted whenever 
possible to make them comparable. For Madagascar, special problems 
arise because the income data are not consistent with the production 
data. The estimates designated "A" combine the various income sur- 
veys without taking such consistency problems into account, and, as a 
result, they probably understate actual income inequality. The esti- 
mates labeled "B" are made by adjusting the rural and urban income 
data so that the totals roughly equal the relevant national income aggre- 
gates; they probably overstate income inequality. The exact methods 
of estimation are published at length elsewhere;3 the key estimates are 
presented in tables 1 and 2. 
The data in table 1 show considerable income inequality in the two 
nations and a marked increase in income inequality over time, espe- 
cially in Malaxi'i. The data in table 2 present overall measures of aver- 
age family incomes and family income inequalities for particular popu- 
lation groups. Such data also permit us to separate the impact of 
intergroup and intragroup differences by setting all incomes in a partic- 
ular group equal to the group average; such a procedure only works for 
those inequality coefficients that are decomposable, that is, the log 
variance and the Theil statistics. 
Structural Features of Income Inequality 
Several features of these estimates immediately draw our attention. 
First, in both countries the single most important factor underlying the 
overall inequalities of income was the difference in average income 
between urban and rural populations. This can be shown by comparing 
the income inequality coefficients for the entire economy without ad- 
justments to the hypothetical situation where all incomes in a particular 
population group are equal to the mean. In three of the four cases the 
inequality coefficients in the latter case accounted for roughly one-half 
or more of total income inequalities. 
Second, in both countries the inequalities in the rural sector were 
considerable, particularly in the later year. It is sometimes claimed that 
in the rural sector of developing countries the distribution of income is 
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TABLE 1 
THE SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 
CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE OF GROSS FAMILY INCOME 
MalaWi Madagascar 
1968/69 1962 
CUMULATIVE PERCENT 1984/85, Estimate A, Estimate B, 1980, 
OF POPULATION Before After before before before Estimate A, 
ARRANGED IN ORDER Direct Direct Direct Direct Direct before 
OF INCREASING INCOMES Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes Direct Taxes 
20 8.2 8.6 3.3 8.1 7.0 5.0 
40 18.8 19.7 9.5 18.6 16.2 13.7 
60 30.9 32.3 19.1 32.8 28.5 27.1 
80 44.6 46.4 34.3 51.0 42.5 47.6 
90 53.8 55.9 47.6 64.2 57.3 62.9 
95 61.1 63.4 58.0 74.3 68.0 73.7 
99 74.6 77.4 75.8 88.9 85.8 91.1 
100 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
SOURCE.-Frederic L. Pryor, "Income Distribution and Economic Development in Madagascar: Some Historical Statistics," World Bank 
Discussion Paper, no. 37 (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1988), table I-5, and "Income Distribution and Economic Development in MalaWi: Some 
Historical Statistics," World Bank Discussion Paper, no. 36 (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1988), table I-5. 
NOTE.-The differences between estimates A and B are explained in the text. 
k) 
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TABLE 2 
INCOME INEQUALITY STATISTICS FOR MALA*I AND MADAGASCAR 
INEQUALITY 
COEFFICIENTS 
AVERAGE 
NUMBER TOTAL Log 
GROUPS OF FAMILIES (1,000) INCOME* Gini Theil variance 
Mala i: 
1968/69: 
Smallholder families 885.0 86.42 .203 .113 .118 
Families on estates 28.0 140.31 .187 .093 .110 
Families in small towns 11.0 606.93 .466 .417 .651 
Families in four major towns 42.6 907.65 .660 .884 1.494 
Total/average 966.5 130.03 .448 .796 .317 
Assuming all incomes in a 
group equal to mean of group 966.5 130.03 .317 .432 .274 
1984/85: 
Smallholder families 1,252.0 358.2 .453 .348 .607 
Families on estates 89.2 425.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Families in small towns 34.2 2,157.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Families in four major towns 98.5 3,235.4 .621 .776 1.065 
Total/average 1,473.9 596.2 .599 .944 .860 
Assuming all incomes in a 
group equal to mean of group 1,473.9 596.2 .365 .447 .361 
Madagascar (estimate A): 
1962: 
Rural 1,076.2 60.9 .290 .194 .220 
Secondary urban centers 36.6 153.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Largest six towns 98.9 199.3 .500 .466 .806 
Total/average 1,211.7 75.0 .391 .371 .352 
Assuming all incomes in a 
group equal to mean of group 1,211.7 75.0 .168 .106 .125 
1980: 
Rural sector 1,542.9 192.9 .435 .329 .517 
Secondary urban centers 140.5 356.2 .487 .399 .747 
Largest seven towns 227.3 462.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Total/average 1,910.8 237.0 .489 .426 .628 
Assuming all incomes in a 
group equal to mean of group 1,910.8 237.0 .154 .065 .096 
NOTE.-All of the coefficients become larger when inequality increases. The Gini 
coefficient lies between 0.0 and 1.0; the others are unbounded. As noted in the dis- 
cussion, the estimates for the two countries are not quite comparable. For each coun- 
try, however, the results are roughly comparable over time. Sources are the same as in 
table 1. n.a. = not available. 
* Income in Mala i Kwacha for Mala i and Malagasy Francs for Madagascar. 
relatively equal since the average incomes are so close to the starvation 
limit. Such an argument-often attributed to Simon Kuznets but found 
in earlier literature as well-does not take into account either the fact 
that there are a number of relatively wealthy peasants, so that the 
distribution has a long tail, or that these data are based on household 
income and would be more equal if income per person were the basis of 
the calculation. 
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In addition, because of the manner in which the Madagascar data 
are estimated, the overall inequality coefficients for the two countries 
cannot be directly compared without further adjustments.4 When such 
adjustments are made (a weighted average of estimates A and B), it 
appears that income inequalities in the rural sector of Madagascar were 
greater, especially in the earlier year. This occurred because land was 
less equally distributed among smallholders in Madagascar than in 
Mala i, a feature arising from differences in the land tenure arrange- 
ments: in Mala i tenancy was very infrequent and a family could hold 
only as much land as it farmed; in Madagascar, the land was more 
privatized.5 
Finally, Madagascar had a greater overall equality of income, due 
primarily to its narrower urban-rural income differentials. As noted, 
some incomparabilities exist between the data of the two countries, but 
the differences in average incomes in the urban and rural sectors were 
too great to be explained by differences in statistical definitions in the 
two nations. 
Changes over Time 
Aside from the increasing inequality of overall income, some other 
important temporal changes should be noted. The changes in income 
distribution, for instance, were particularly important in the rural sec- 
tor, which also had the lowest average income; in the urban sector, 
income differentials seemed to remain roughly constant. In Madagas- 
car, however, the estimation procedure may have understated any 
adverse changes in the urban sector; and, moreover, in the mid-1980s 
the income inequalities in the cities undoubtedly increased as unem- 
ployment rose and the rice subsidy was removed. Also, the influences 
of migration from the low income rural sector to the higher income 
urban sector were not important in either country. More specifically, 
simulations of the impact of population shift using the data in table 2 
made little difference in the calculated inequality coefficients.6 
Intrasectoral Income Differences 
Urban Sector 
In the urban sector I found little evidence that the Mala i government 
intervened in a conscious manner to change the distribution of wage 
income. The government's basic needs strategy focused more on the 
raising of income levels than on distributional issues per se. The wage 
control policies focused primary attention on the average wages in 
particular sectors, rather than on the structure of wages per se. 
In Madagascar the situation was quite different and the most im- 
portant measures deserve a brief review. In the period from 1977 to 
1979 the government took three steps to influence the urban income 
distribution: first, it raised the minimum wages in the lowest wage 
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categories at a faster rate than the minimum wage in higher categories; 
second, it revised the civil service pay scale to favor the lowest paid 
workers (and to freeze the pay of the higher civil servants); and third, it 
also began to subsidize sales to the urban sector of such basic products 
as rice, the main staple and the largest single purchase in the budgets of 
the poor. This acted in a progressive manner on the urban income 
distribution but had a regressive effect for the income distribution of 
the nation as a whole since such subsidies were essentially financed by 
the rural sector which received a price lower than a free market price 
for its crops (especially those farmers who produced crops for ex- 
ports). The subsidy on food consumption of the urban population was 
eliminated in the mid-1980s as part of the liberalization program, a 
policy step particularly painful to the government. 
The Malagasy government also implemented a number of other 
policies to narrow the income distribution in urban areas, but these 
often achieved results opposite to what was intended. For instance, in 
the 1980s the government set low prices for edible oils and condensed 
milk (two important commodities in the household budgets of the 
poor), but this led to a decline of domestic production and their avail- 
ability to the poor. 
Rural Sector 
Increases in income inequality within the rural sector-particularly 
among smallholders-were the critical factor underlying the overall 
increase in income inequality in both nations. Before turning to the 
impact of various governmental policies, it is useful to consider for a 
moment the impact of diminishing returns to labor on the land, a factor 
also leading to greater rural income inequalities. Although both coun- 
tries experienced a land shortage, they responded in different manners. 
In Mala i the average size of a smallholder farm declined mark- 
edly from the 1960s through the mid-1980s; there was very little unused 
arable land to be found, especially in the most populous southern 
region, so the rural economy was operating on the intensive margin. 
Since techniques of land intensification were not yet introduced on a 
large scale, it seems likely that the same percentage population in- 
crease in the three regions (north, central, and south) would drive 
average agricultural incomes further down in the southern region 
where diminishing returns were more severe than in the other regions; 
and, indeed, this appears to have happened.' In Madagascar the aver- 
age smallholder's farm increased in size, but both land and labor pro- 
ductivity were falling, that is, the rural economy was operating on the 
extensive margin and was bringing into production land of increasingly 
bad quality. This mechanism slowed to some degree the widening of 
regional income inequalities in the rural sector. 
Government policies played, I believe, a more important role than 
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diminishing returns in influencing the distribution of rural income, and 
these measures need careful consideration for each country. The argu- 
ment can only be made in a qualitative fashion since the available data 
do not permit an exact determination of the impact of the various 
policies. 
Malavii. Hastings Kamuzu Banda led his country to indepen- 
dence in 1964 and has remained in power ever since. His government 
followed an agricultural policy toward the smallholders that might be 
labeled (after a similarly oriented policy of the last Russian tsar) a 
"wager on the strong," focusing most of the public resources placed in 
agriculture on the richest farmers. 
Before outlining the way in which such a strategy was imple- 
mented, I must emphasize that a wager on the strong is a defensible 
development strategy if three conditions are met: if resources chan- 
neled to the strong are more productive than if expended on the rest of 
the agricultural sector; if there is some trickle-down of the benefits 
from the wealthier part of the agricultural sector to the poorer; and if 
the poorer part of the agricultural sector is not disadvantaged by other 
government policies, by natural conditions, or by its interaction with 
the wealthier part of the agricultural sector. Although it lies beyond the 
scope of this article to argue these matters in detail, none of the three 
conditions were met in Mala i.8 The particular agricultural policies of 
the Mala i government have given rise to considerable criticism. 
The Mala i government carried out its wager on the strong in a 
variety of ways, of which the most important were: 
a) In its development budget (roughly, the capital budget), the 
government invested from one-half to two-thirds of all resources in 
four large-scale integrated development projects. Before the projects 
started, three of the four development areas had average net farm 
incomes roughly twice as high as the national average; the fourth had 
average farm incomes slightly below the national average. Further- 
more, within each of the four development areas, the number of 
families actually adopting the "technology and credit" package was 
less than one-third of the total number of families, so that the govern- 
mental funds focused on a relatively small percentage of the total popu- 
lation. 
b) The technology and credit package, which the government of- 
fered smallholders, required them to use certain agricultural tech- 
niques in return for credit to purchase fertilizers, seeds, and other 
inputs. Such a package, however, involved the purchasing of large 
quantities of fertilizer, and such input amounts were suitable only for 
relatively large farms. The seeds were also for a hybrid maize for 
export, which was planted only by the richest smallholders. This is 
because such hybrid maize did not store well and also did not corre- 
spond to local tastes. The poorer smallholders followed a "safety first" 
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strategy by first planting enough of the local maize to feed their 
families; only those with considerable extra land would plant the hy- 
brid maize to the extent that they were able to take advantage of the 
technology and credit package. It should not be surprising, therefore, 
that most credit went to the wealthier smallholders. In the most recent 
long-term plan, this situation was noted and policies were planned for 
the late 1980s which would lead to a much wider distribution of credit 
and a change in the package so as to be more suitable for the small- 
holders with relatively small farm areas.9 
c) The poorer farmers were forced to sell all of their export 
crops as well as most of their domestic crops destined for the urban 
areas to the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation 
(ADMARC), a monopsonistic purchasing parastatal. Over the decade 
of the 1970s ADMARC paid an increasingly lower percentage of the 
world market price. A particular set of richer farmers-designated 
"master farmers"-were permitted to sell their export crops at world 
market prices and receive considerably higher prices. They also re- 
ceived a priority in the supply of farm inputs, whenever these were 
scarce because of foreign exchange shortages, and special credits. 
d) Although Mala i had a relatively impressive network of exten- 
sion workers, this service did not reach certain subsectors of the small- 
holding sector, for example, female-headed households, which made 
up about one-third of all rural households in the most populous region 
and which were often the poorest households. Agricultural research 
was also not oriented toward the problems faced by the poorest small- 
holders. 
e) In its educational policies, the Mala i government placed little 
emphasis on increasing the primary school enrollment. This disadvan- 
taged the poor families in the rural sector and contributed to income 
inequality. 
Mala i was one of the few African countries to pursue in a con- 
scious fashion a development strategy favoring the agricultural sector. 
The government, however, provided the greatest help to two subsec- 
tors: the richest smallholders and the public and private estates. The 
estates were aided by generous credit from state banks, a method used 
by the government to circumvent the bureaucracy in the Ministry of 
Agriculture. The gamble on estate production paid off since such pro- 
duction was the leading sector underlying Mala i's economic growth 
during the 1970s. 
Although many have criticized Mala i's emphasis on estates, 
such policies did not have a direct effect on the distribution of income 
within the smallholder sector; the indirect effects were minor.10 It was 
the wager on the strong that led to a widening of rural income differen- 
tials. Mala i thus serves as an important counterexample to the oft- 
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made but careless generalization that a development strategy based on 
agriculture per se leads to a more equal distribution of income. 
Madagascar. In Madagascar the situation was rather different. 
After independence in 1960 the government of Philibert Tsiranana 
placed a considerable share of its development budget in the rural 
sector. It followed, however, a wager on the strong strategy, with 
emphasis on certain integrated development projects and with govern- 
ment aid and credit directed primarily at the richest smallholders and 
the estates. 
The government of Gabriel Ramanantsoa (1972-75) attempted 
both to increase the share of government investment in the rural areas 
and to reverse the emphasis on aiding the richest farmers. Some ob- 
servers have argued that during this period there was a considerable 
change in the village leadership and the distribution of such govern- 
mental aid, with more aid going to farms of smaller size; these matters, 
however, cannot be easily confirmed. 
The socialist government of Didier Ratsiraka (1975 to the present) 
followed a much different development strategy, decreasing invest- 
ment in the rural areas and increasing investment in industry. In 1978- 
79 it inaugurated a program of "invest to the hilt" (a Malagasy version 
of the Chinese Great Leap Forward), which had catastrophic results: a 
quintupling of the foreign debt, a dramatic decline in per capita GDP, 
and a chronic balance-of-payments crisis lasting for a decade. During 
the Ratsiraka period up to the mid-1980s, the following policies in- 
fluenced the distribution of income in the smallholder sector. 
a) After 1975 agricultural credit was channeled primarily to the 
richer smallholders and estates, especially since several programs of- 
fering credit to smaller farms were cut back or dropped. 
b) During its first decade the Ratsiraka government diverted funds 
for maintenance of the roads to other purposes. Given the minor im- 
portance of railroads and other means of transportation of crops, this 
meant that the major impact of the breakdown of transportation fell on 
areas far removed from the cities; and those areas also had the lowest 
per capita incomes. 
c) The Ratsiraka government turned the internal terms of trade 
against the rural sector so that real agricultural prices were lower than 
before." This meant that those farmers who relied primarily on their 
sales to official governmental purchasing agencies received less for 
their products; they were, in large part, smallholders with relatively 
little to sell, that is, the lower income smallholders. 
d) The Ramanantsoa government began nationalizing the crop 
purchasing companies, and the process was completed by the Rat- 
siraka government. As an inadvertent result, there was a breakdown of 
markets. This can be seen by examining the coefficient of variation of 
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market prices for various agricultural products in the 17 subprefec- 
tures: the statistic shows a tripling of the weighted coefficient of varia- 
tions between the early and the mid-1970s. Important parallel markets 
for foodstuffs developed in the cities, and those most able to take 
advantage of the high prices (often more than double the official prices) 
were usually the richest farmers, who had the resources to bribe or 
purchase trucking services. 
e) The foreign exchange scarcity induced by the overvalued ex- 
change rate made it difficult for many to obtain the necessary agricul- 
tural inputs such as insecticides and fertilizers, not to mention con- 
sumer goods. This development also benefited the richest farmers 
since they had the working capital for payments to obtain the scarce 
inputs or to pay parallel market prices for consumer goods. 
f) Although the various Malagasy governments made valient ef- 
forts to achieve 100% enrollment rates in the primary schools, illiteracy 
did not fall the fastest in the poorest provinces. Further, during the 
decade after the 1970s, graduates of various schools had considerable 
difficulties in finding jobs commensurate with their education. Thus, 
education did not appear to narrow income differences, at least during 
the period under investigation. 
Changes in the Ratio of Urban and Rural Incomes 
A very important feature of the income structure in both countries was 
the very great difference between average incomes in the urban and 
rural sectors, and the narrowing of such differentials over time. This 
has acted to lower overall income inequalities, that is, to counteract the 
impact of the widening income differentials in the rural areas. 
Although the differences beween the two countries appear consid- 
erable, they are due in part to the nature of the data. If we adjust the 
Malagasy income data to make them more consistent with production 
data (i.e., estimate B), the urban-rural differences become twice as 
great (as estimate A). Furthermore, the Mala i data include expatri- 
ates in the urban sector; the Madagascar data exclude them. If the data 
were made comparable in this manner, the Madagascar ratio of average 
urban to rural incomes would undoubtedly be still higher. 
The differences between urban and rural incomes between the two 
countries are not just statistical artifacts but also reflect some real 
contrasts. During colonial times the French farmers in Madagascar 
were much more widespread through the countryside than the English 
were in the Nyasaland colony. In order to aid these colonists, the 
French also invested considerably in rural infrastructure, which, to a 
certain extent, aided the Malagasy smallholders as well. In Mala i, 
governmental investment in the rural sector was relatively small until 
after the Second World War. 
From the data presented in table 2 this urban/rural income differ- 
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ence can be studied from various aspects. Of greatest importance is 
that both countries reveal a narrowing of the urban/rural income gap 
because real urban incomes fell between the 1960s and the 1980s. 
MalaVi 
In Mala i between 1968/69 and 1984/85, average smallholder family 
income increased roughly 6%, while such income in the major towns 
declined about 25%. Among smallholders it is noteworthy that real 
family income from wages and salaries (representing off-farm employ- 
ment) declined about 42%, largely because the part-time jobs in the 
urban areas previously held by smallholders were now being taken by 
rural dwellers moving permanently to the informal sector in the towns. 
Underlying this fall in urban income was a decrease in the real 
wage. From 1968 through 1985 average real wages in the modern sector 
fell at an average annual rate of about 3.8% a year. Several mecha- 
nisms appear to account for this dramatic decline. 
Rise ofprofits at the expense ofwages. Over the period 1968-85, 
the share of profits in the national income increased considerably, 
while the share of wages fell. In the decade before independence, the 
share of property income from the modern sector in the total national 
income fluctuated between 5% and 10%; after independence it rose to a 
high of 23% in 1977, before falling to 15% in 1979, the last year for 
which such data are available. A Stolper-Samuelson-Rybczynski 
mechanism appears to have been in operation, that is, capital- (and 
land-) intensive production increased at a faster rate than more labor- 
intensive production, which raised the relative share of property in- 
come in the total national income. More specifically, agricultural 
exports rose faster than the GDP; the Central Bank maintained the 
exchange rate at roughly the equilibrium level; the relative prices of 
traded goods (crops) rose in comparison to nontraded goods and ser- 
vices; incomes in the sectors selling these export goods increased; and 
real wages in the sector producing nontraded goods (which includes 
many urban workers) fell.12 The fall in the wage share led to a fall in 
urban incomes since the increase in total income in the economy was 
not sufficiently great to offset such changes. 
Composition of the urban labor force. Part of the fall in real 
wages for the economy as a whole can also be attributed to a shift in the 
composition of the labor force so that the lower paid agricultural work- 
ers (estate workers) constituted a larger share of employment in the 
modern sector. In the urban sector alone, however, real wages have 
experienced an average annual fall of 3.2%; moreover, there was a shift 
toward jobs paying lower than average wages." 3 For instance, between 
1969 and 1976, three-quarters of the newly created private-sector jobs 
were for unskilled jobs at wage levels below the average wage; such a 
composition effect lowers average wages over time, even if real wages 
This content downloaded from 130.58.65.20 on Tue, 28 Apr 2015 19:53:46 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
34 Economic Development and Cultural Change 
for every specific job remained the same. Scattered evidence also sug- 
gests that as Mala ians began to fill high income jobs previously held 
by European expatriates, the salaries of these jobs were also reduced. 
Although adequate wage data to analyze the question in detail are not 
available, I suspect that real wages for most specific jobs probably 
declined over the period, although at a relatively slow rate. 
Other factors. Unemployment per se was not responsible for any 
fall in average real wages, since the rate of joblessness appears low.14 
Mala i had a considerable shortage of skilled workers, and, indeed, 
there was a relative rise of wages and salaries of those with more 
education in the years 1966-77. The joblessness that occurred was 
primarily among the unskilled, and this undoubtedly acted to pull down 
real wages at the low end of the wage scale. Aggressive actions by the 
labor unions to prevent this fall in real wages was also discouraged by 
the government. 
Madagascar 
In Madagascar between 1962 and 1980, average family incomes in the 
rural sector remained roughly the same while such incomes (excluding 
expatriates) in the major towns declined about 27%. 5 Real wages in the 
modern sector fell throughout the entire independence period. From 
1960 and 1970 real average annual wages in the private sector declined 
slowly-about 0.8% a year; and from 1966 through 1984, average an- 
nual wages of industrial workers fell faster-at about 2.3% a year. 
Several contrasts can be drawn with Mala i. 
Rise of profits at the expense of wages. Although profit data are 
not available, it does not appear that this factor was very important. 
After 1975 considerable nationalization took place and the parastatal 
sector was subsidized, rather than serving as a source of profits. Fur- 
thermore, the Stolper-Samuelson-Rybczynski mechanism was not op- 
erative because foreign trade increased more slowly than the GDP and 
the relative prices of tradables did not greatly change in comparison to 
nontradables. 
Composition of the urban labor force. Employment in the mod- 
ern sector increased during the period from 1960 through 1984 at 
roughly 2.3% per year, which was considerably lower than the 6.1% 
annual rise in population in the urban areas. Since the modern sector in 
the countryside was not an important source of employment growth, 
the urban informal sector absorbed the new labor. Although the income 
of those in the informal sector is not included as wages, it had a de- 
pressing impact on the lowest urban wages. Within the formal urban 
sector, the fastest growing segment was the government sector, and in 
recent years the government raised wages at a much lower rate than 
inflation in order to reduce the government deficit. 
Other factors. Unemployment was much higher in Madagascar 
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than in Mala i. For instance, in 1980 the unemployed in the urban 
areas registered as seeking work amounted to over 8% of the labor 
force outside of agriculture; and from 1970 to the mid-1980s, the num- 
ber of those registered as unemployed tripled. Actual unemployment 
was, of course, much higher than was registered unemployment. An- 
tananarivo, the largest city, for instance, had an unemployment rate of 
more than 30% in the early 1980s.16 Such unemployment exercised a 
downward pressure on wages. 
A Note on Poverty 
To what extent did the growth-or decline-of per capita income in- 
fluence the income of the poorest segment of the population? One 
method of studying the problem is to take as the "poverty line" the 
income of families in the fortieth percentile in an early year and then to 
determine the percentage of families with incomes (adjusted for 
changes in prices) below this poverty line in a later year. Using this 
procedure we find that the percentage of those in poverty increased in 
both countries, especially Mala i.17 Contrary to expectations based on 
general considerations of the nature of economic growth, poverty in- 
creased more in the country with the highest growth of per capita 
income. 
This rather startling conclusion does not, however, correspond 
with more casual evidence of the very poorest from both countries. For 
instance, there is less visual evidence of human misery in Mala i than 
in Madagascar. 18 Also, unless the particular statistic used to calculate 
the overall inequality of income places particularly heavy weight on the 
lowest income levels, it is by no means certain that comparisons of the 
entire income distributions of the two countries would yield the same 
results as comparisons of the truly destitute. 
Given the uncertain nature of income data at lower levels in any 
country, comparisons of poverty can be carried out best by examining 
a series of physical indicators of well-being that are particularly sensi- 
tive to real incomes of the poorest segment of the population. Such 
data suggest that the extent of poverty does not appear very different in 
the two countries; in other words, the inequality statistics presented in 
the discussion above do not capture an important aspect of the income 
distribution. The physical data also reveal different trends over time. 
Infant Mortality 
Although at independence Mala i and Madagascar had quite different 
rates of infant mortality, these rates appear to have converged by the 
mid-1980s. 
In Mala i infant mortality declined from about 204 per thousand 
in 1967, to 176 per thousand in 1977, to roughly 160 per thousand in 
1982.19 This does not necessarily indicate a fall in poverty as measured 
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by income since infant mortality has decreased in many African na- 
tions where poverty has not decreased; it does, however, show an 
increase in physical well-being. 
For Madagascar information about infant mortality rates is much 
more uncertain.20 For 1975, estimates range from 68 per thousand (the 
official census datum) to 160 per thousand (a rather uncertain calcula- 
tion based on use of fertility rates and age distribution data). In later 
years similar data uncertainties occur and, for 1985, my own estimate 
is that infant mortality was roughly 150 per thousand, although this 
may be on the high side. There is considerable evidence that infant 
mortality rates increased from the late 1970s through the mid-1980s, 
only part of which can be attributed to improvements in the system of 
collecting mortality information. 
Birth Weight 
Aggregative information on the birth weight of infants is often used as a 
measure of the nutritional status of the women bearing the children.21 
In Madagascar, a nationwide sample survey in 1984 revealed that 
14.4% of the infants had a birth weight of less than 2,500 grams; smaller 
scale studies record considerably higher percentages. In Mala i only 
partial studies are available; one survey of all babies born in Malavi 
hospitals and health centers in July 1964 (admittedly only a fraction of 
total newborn babies) showed that 16.5% had birth weights lower than 
2,500 grams. The difference in these percentages between the two 
countries appears significant; however, the quality of the data are poor, 
and not too much emphasis should be placed on such results. 
Measurements of Weight and Height of Children 
Anthropometric data of children revealing undernourishment are in- 
creasingly used as measurements of absolute poverty.22 The under- 
nutrition data suggest few important differences in the two countries. 
For Mala 
vi data are available from an impressive national survey 
of children of smallholders, which was carried out in conjunction with 
the 1980/81 National Sample Survey of Agriculture. For Madagascar a 
considerable number of smaller scale studies have been carried out on 
the topic, and for table 3 I have used data from three recent studies, 
which, unfortunately, covered relatively prosperous areas. It is likely, 
therefore, that a nationwide study would show greater undernutrition. 
Also included in table 3 is similar information for other countries so 
that an international perspective can be gained. 
A weight/height ratio smaller than 90% (or roughly 2 standard 
deviations) of the international norm reflects acute undernutrition. Us- 
ing this criterion, Mala i and Madagascar probably had roughly the 
same degree of acute undernutrition and, moreover, a higher degree 
than most other African nations. For Mala i, some expected differ- 
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EVIDENCE ON UNDERNUTRITION 
Acute Undernutrition Chronic Undernutrition Underweight 
(<80% median (<90% median (<80% median 
Country and Date Ages in weight/height) height/age) weight/age) 
of Survey Months (%) (%) (%) 
MalaCWi rural, 1980/81: 0-60 
North 
1.4* 
64.6* 30.8 
Central 1.8* 61.4" 31.1 
South 2.8* 53.0* 31.0 
Total 2.3* 57.8* 31.0 
Madagascar, 1984: 
Antsirabe rural 0-60 .8 60.8 34.1 
Antsirabe urban 0-60 .6 51.5 28.8 
Toamasina urban 0-60 3.5 33.0 38.0 
Cameroon, 1978 3-60 1.0 22.1 21.1 
Egypt, 1978 6-72 .6 21.2 14.8* 
Lesotho, 1976 3-60 1.1 22.7 22.0 
Liberia, 1976 0-60 1.6 18.0 24.0 
Senegal (Sine-Saloum region), 1982 0-60 4.4 26.1t n.a. 
Sierra Leone, 1978 3-60 3.0 24.2 30.5 
Swaziland, 1983 3-60 .4 16.6 12.4 
Togo, 1977 6-72 2.0 18.8 30.3 
SOURCES.-All data for MalaWi refer only to children from smallholder families and are based on an arithmetic average of data taken before and 
after the main harvest. The detailed data and sources are presented in Frederic L. Pryor, "Income Distribution and Economic Development in 
MalaWi: Some Historical Statistics, World Bank Discussion Paper, no. 36 (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1988), table J-6. The Madagascar data and 
sources, as well as the results of other nutritional surveys, are discussed in Frederic L. Pryor, "Income Distribution and Economic Development in 
Madagascar: Some Historical Statistics," World Bank Discussion Paper, no. 37 (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1988), sec. J. The data for the other 
countries are drawn from surveys carried out by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta and by the University of California, Los Angeles, 
School of Public Health. They were supplied by Nancy Binkin of the CDC and come from Mary Serdula et al, "Acute and Chronic Undernutrition in 
Swaziland," Journal of Tropical Pediatrics 33 (February 1987): 35-42. 
NOTE.-The measurements refer to World Health Organization norms. The dash in the age ranges indicates "up to but excluding." n.a. = not 
available. 
* Originally presented in terms of standard deviations from the normed median; now adjusted to the percentage definition used in this table. 
t The sample for this statistic includes only children from 3 to 60 months of age. 
--- 
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ences appear when comparisons are made before and after the harvest. 
Furthermore, the highest acute undernutrition occurred in the southern 
region where family incomes are lowest and land scarcity is greatest. 
The height/age norm has some problems as a measure of chronic 
undernourishment, especially because of the controversy concerning 
the cutoff point to designate undernutrition. Although 90% (about 2 
standard deviations) is used in table 3, some experts place the cutoff 
point at 85% or 3 standard deviations, which would reduce the count of 
chronically undernourished roughly by half. 
By this measure both Mala 'i and Madagascar had a high degree of 
chronic undernutrition, about 50%-60% of their children. This appears 
much higher than in other African nations and, given the relatively low 
acute undernutrition, such results seem rather peculiar. To interpret 
these data, two conjectures can be offered: either the children in the 
two countries suffered from repeated spells of illness, which meant that 
they might not have been acutely undernourished at any single time but 
that the long run impact of such sickness led to a cumulative stunting, 
or the ages of the Mala ian and Malagasy children were considerably 
overestimated. Lacking detailed data, a definitive resolution of this 
interpretative problem cannot be given. 
The weight/age norm is the most popular method of measuring 
chronic protein-calorie undernutrition. It is also, however, the most 
ambiguous of the three measurements for several reasons. It is quite 
sensitive to estimates of age; and among a population with consider- 
able illiteracy, age estimates in months are often rather uncertain. Fur- 
thermore, different investigators define undernutrition at different 
levels-from 75% to 90% of the World Health Organization (WHO) 
norms. Moreover, the presence of edema may make weight mislead- 
ingly high. Finally, children with low weight for age do not necessarily 
have marasmus but may be short for their age so that their low weight 
is appropriate for their low height, a situation that seemed to be the 
case in Mala i.23 
These weight/age data suggest that about one-third of the children 
in Mala i and Madagascar were undernourished. These figures are 
somewhat higher than for the other African countries, but much lower 
than for some developing countries elsewhere. Weight/age data for 
other areas from other, less complete, studies (which are not shown in 
the table) suggest that undernutrition is somewhat greater in Madagas- 
car than in Mala i.24 
In sum, the anthropometric data suggest that the critical problem 
in both Mala i and Madagascar was chronic rather than acute under- 
nutrition. Further, there appeared few important differences between 
the two countries: data for Antsirabe (a wealthy area) suggest lower 
undernutrition than in Mala i, while the data from Toamasina (a 
poorer area) suggest the reverse. 
This content downloaded from 130.58.65.20 on Tue, 28 Apr 2015 19:53:46 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Frederic L. Pryor 39 
Poverty Trends 
Times series for an assessment of trends are considerably more prob- 
lematic, and only the infant mortality data permit comparisons be- 
tween the two countries.25 
The decrease in infant mortality in Malax i, as noted above, does 
not provide unambiguous evidence about a decline in poverty. The 
increase in infant mortality in Madagascar strongly suggests an in- 
crease in absolute poverty, since the infant mortality rate is highly 
sensitive to changes in income of the very poorest. This conclusion is 
supported by scattered data showing that in the 1980s an increasingly 
higher percentage of children admitted to certain hospitals showed 
signs of undernutrition.26 Starvation also appears to have increased in 
recent years although little reliable information on the subject is avail- 
able. For instance, the opposition leader, Monja Jaona, noted in a 
speech in October 1986 that about 47,000 people had recently died from 
hunger in three areas in the southern part of the island. The govern- 
ment officially denied the number but did accept the fact that some 
such deaths had occurred. 
The increase of poverty in Madagascar was due in greatest mea- 
sure to those governmental economic policies that led to a reduction in 
average income following the fall of the Tsiranana government. In 
particular, the shift in relative prices against the agricultural sector 
discouraged agricultural production for the market. The "invest to the 
hilt" program, the overvalued exchange rate, other foreign trade 
policies, and governmental expenditures directed toward the mainte- 
nance of large armed forces rather than for other purposes led to a 
general shortage of inputs. 
Growth and Income Distribution: Some Conclusions 
It was certainly not inevitable that economic growth be accompanied 
by widening income differentials in Malax i. The last decade of the 
colonial years in that country provided some evidence that, given the 
right set of incentives, production and incomes in the smallholder sec- 
tor could grow rapidly. It was also not inevitable that Madagascar 
experience both an economic decline and an increase in income differ- 
entials. In both countries the major cause of overall increases in in- 
come inequality can be traced to a widening of income differentials 
among smallholders caused by a variety of policy failures, almost all of 
which were correctable. 
Some general conclusions that have relevance for other nations 
can be drawn from these comparisons of Mala i and Madagascar. 
1. In discussions about the relationship of economic growth and 
income distribution in developing countries, too much attention has 
focused on the urban sector. In poor agricultural countries such as 
Mala i and Madagascar, income changes within the rural sector or 
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between the rural and urban sectors have been more important deter- 
minants of the inequality of income. Furthermore, the mechanism pro- 
posed by Simon Kuznets that linked economic growth, the transfer of 
workers from the rural sector to the urban sector, and the increasing 
inequality in the overall distribution of income does not appear very 
important in explaining what happened in these nations.27 
2. Governmental emphasis on agricultural growth does not neces- 
sarily insure that rural incomes, especially of smallholders, will dra- 
matically rise or that such incomes will become more equal. The 
Malax i experience shows that such agricultural growth can be focused 
primarily on the estate sector and the richest smallholders, so that 
income inequalities in the smallholder sector will widen. Unfortu- 
nately, the obvious fact that the agricultural sector is not homogeneous 
seems overlooked by many who make facile generalizations about de- 
velopment strategies and income distribution. 
3. Government policies that have nothing to do with the distribu- 
tion of income per se can have extremely important influences on 
income inequalities. In both countries administrative procedures con- 
cerning credit and the sale of agricultural inputs have acted to favor the 
richer farmers. In Mala i the two-tier agricultural pricing policies have 
widened income differentials. In Madagascar the nationalization of 
crop purchasing and sales to farmers had the same result; in addition, 
neglect of transportation maintenance led to a breakdown of rural mar- 
kets, which acted to widen income differentials. 
4. The tax system has an important role to play in the distribution 
of income. As shown in table 1, the incidence of direct and indirect 
taxes in Mala i was mildly progressive but no such incidence was 
observed in Madagascar. If, however, account is taken of the implicit 
taxes on the rural sector through low prices offered by monopsonistic 
crop purchasing agencies, the impact of the fiscal system in both na- 
tions was regressive since it placed a burden on the poorest segment of 
the population, the smallholders. This is true of many countries in 
many poor agricultural nations. In such cases an equilibrium exchange 
rate, which would raise the market prices for agriculture, would proba- 
bly do more to narrow income inequalities than any other single set of 
measures. Unfortunately, politics in most developing nations are 
primarily urban matters since the rural areas are difficult to organize 
for political purposes. Such urban bias in the tax structure, while re- 
grettable, is not surprising. 
5. Commonly used overall measures of income inequality tell us 
little about the relative importance or behavior of poverty in an abso- 
lute sense. For instance, although Mala i had a greater income in- 
equality than Madagascar, the various health indicators suggest that 
the two nations had roughly the same degree of poverty. Overall mea- 
sures also show a greater increase in income inequality in Mala i than 
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in Madagascar; as measured by infant mortality rates, however, pov- 
erty appeared to increase more in Madagascar. 
6. Many direct measures to redistribute income are unlikely to 
achieve their desired ends. Given the fiscal constraints facing both 
governments, the extent to which redistribution of income can be car- 
ried out through the expenditure side of the government budget is 
highly limited. 
The detailed study of income distribution trends in the poorest 
nations of the world is important in order to design policies, especially 
concerning agriculture, that can bring about both growth and equity. A 
beginning has been made by others,28 and in this study I have tried to 
investigate other aspects of the problem, especially with regard to 
policies that have hitherto received relatively little attention. Such a 
task, of course, is difficult, for it involves both piecing together rela- 
tively poor quality data and linking trends in income distribution with 
particular policies. Such linkages can only be determined by micro- 
studies of the ways in which such policies have worked out in particu- 
lar countries; and the major analytic problem is to separate the impact 
of different economic policies. 
In addition, this type of case study evidence would probably not 
be of sufficient quality and quantity to carry out a sophisticated cross- 
country or intracountry statistical analysis or to sort out unambigu- 
ously the major causal factors involved. Nevertheless, a sufficient 
amount of systematic case study materials linking policies and income 
distribution trends can be gathered to generate presumptive cases for 
or against certain types of governmental measures in particular situa- 
tions, especially if such evidence buttresses existing theoretical evi- 
dence. Theoretical evidence alone is often disregarded by policymak- 
ers because it is difficult for them to gain a clear understanding of 
abstract relationships. 
In sum, the lists of factors that influence income distribution pre- 
sented in this and other studies provide the bones for a useful analytic 
skeleton. For such work to have an impact on policy, we need to 
investigate more closely a greater variety of these bones and, more- 
over, to provide them with more flesh. 
Notes 
* This research was financed by the World Bank for its Comparative 
Project on the Political Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Growth, which was 
directed by Deepak Lal, Hla Myint, and George Psacharopoulos. For com- 
ments on previous drafts of this article I thank Jonathan Kydd, Guy Pourcet, 
Zora Pryor, and Larry Westphal, as well as fellow participants of the research 
project. The World Bank does not endorse any of my evidence or conclusions, 
and I alone am responsible for any errors. Please note that for both countries I 
am focusing on the period from independence in the early or mid-1960s to the 
mid-1980s. The discussion is in the past tense, since both economies have 
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experienced considerable structural changes since then. Also, note that one 
adjectival form of Madagascar is Malagasy. 
1. All growth rates in this essay are calculated by fitting an exponential 
curve to time series. The raw data come from Frederic L. Pryor, "Income 
Distribution and Economic Development in Madagascar: Some Historical Sta- 
tistics" (hereafter "Madagascar HS"), World Bank Discussion Paper, no. 37 
(World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1988), app. E, and "Income Distribution and 
Economic Development in Mala ii: Some Historical Statistics" (hereafter 
"Mala ii HS"), World Bank Discussion Paper, no. 36 (World Bank, Washing- 
ton, D.C., 1988), app. E. According to the recent calculations of Robert Sum- 
mers and Alan Heston, "A New Set of International Comparisons of Real 
Product and Price Level Estimates for 130 Countries, 1950-1985," Review of 
Income and Wealth 34 (March 1988): 1-25, the per capita GDP's of Mala ii and 
Madagascar in 1980 were, respectively, $417 and $589. 
2. These ideas draw deeply upon the approach of Gary S. Fields, Poverty, 
Inequality, and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 
who noted that "without exception the results emerge that variations within 
sectors or regions are much more important in accounting for inequality than 
variations between sectors" (p. 115). This does not appear true in a static sense 
for either country; however, it does describe the trends of income for both. 
3. "Madagascar HS," app. I, and "Mala i HS," app. I. 
4. Estimate B for Madagascar is considerably more comparable to the 
Mala ii data than estimate A; unfortunately, estimate B could not be made for 
the later year. 
5. For the smallholder sector in Mala i, the Gini coefficients of planted 
land per household were .369 and .381 in 1968/69 and 1984/85, respectively (per 
family member, these Gini coefficients were, respectively, .294 and .296). For 
the smallholder sector in Madagascar, the Gini coefficient of total land per 
household was .445 in 1962; and the Gini coefficient for planted land per house- 
hold was .380 in 1984/85. These data come from Frederic L. Pryor, Mala~ti and 
Madagascar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, in press), appendix, un- 
revised table A-2. 
6. Although urbanization increased in both Mala ii and Madagascar, the 
rates were considerably less than many other developing countries have expe- 
rienced. In Mala ii, between 1966 and 1977, the total population grew at an 
average annual rate of 2.9%, while population in the urban areas increased 
somewhere between 4.7% and 8.0%. In Madagascar, between 1966 and 1985, 
the population grew at an average rate of 2.5%, while population in the urban 
areas was increasing at a rate of 6.1%. In both countries, the urban population 
increased somewhat faster in the smaller urban centers than in the large cities 
(where average incomes were relatively higher). The data come from 
"Madagascar HS," app. A, and "Mala i HS," app. A. The simulations men- 
tioned in the text involve recalculating the inequality coefficients with different 
assumptions about the population in various groups. 
7. Regional income data for both countries are presented in Pryor, Malaid 
and Madagascar, appendix, unrevised table I-1. 
8. This is argued in detail in ibid. 
9. In the past, smallholders were often reluctant to form a cooperative to 
obtain credit and purchase fertilizer because all would be responsible for the 
debts of a single individual. The discussion of the proposed changes in the 
coming decade is found in Mala i, Office of the President and Cabinet, State- 
ment of Development Policies, 1987-1996 (Zomba: Government Printer, 1988). 
Among other things, the plan argued that fertilizer should be sold in smaller 
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sacks so that it could be purchased by smallholders with relatively small hold- 
ings. 
10. I have argued this in greater detail in Mala~i and Madagascar. 
11. The data mentioned in this and the following paragraph come from 
ibid., chap. 12. 
12. This mechanism is spelled out more completely by Deepak Lal, 
"Stolper-Samuelson-Rybczynski n the Pacific: Real Wages and Exchange 
Rates in the Philippines, 1956-78," Journal of Development Economics 21 
(April 1986): 181-204. 
13. Katherine Sierra, "MalaCWi: Employment Aspects of Economic De- 
velopment," World Bank Report 3453-MAI (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 
1981). 
14. MalaWi, National Statistical Office, Mala~i Population Census, 1977: 
Analytical Report (Zomba: Government Printer, 1984), p. 167, reported that 
unemployment amounted to about 4.8% of the economically active in the urban 
sector, and 1.9% of the economically active in the rural sector. A smaller-scale 
survey, which is reported by Katherine Sierra, MalaZi: Employment Aspects 
of Economic Development, World Bank Report No. 3453-MAI (Washington, 
D.C., 1981), pp. 17-20 and was carried out in Blantyre in 1972, shows a 
similarly low unemployment rate: 3.7% of the labor force, mostly among 
poorly educated workers. Data to support other arguments in this paragraph 
come from "MalaWi HS" (n. 1 above), table J-3. It is noteworthy that in the 
late 1960s, according to Robert A. Jones and Roger J. Robinson, "Income 
Distribution and Development: Rhodesia and MalaWi Compared," Rhodesian 
Journal of Economics 10 (June 1976): 91-103, Southern Rhodesia had even 
greater inequalities of wages and salaries than did MalaWi, even though in a 
relative sense it had a much greater pool of skilled labor on which to draw. 
Therefore, some of these urban income inequalities were due less to education 
than to nonmarket forces. 
15. The data on wages and the labor force are very scattered and incom- 
plete. The data used in this discussion come from "Madagascar HS" (n. 1 
above), sec. H. 
16. An estimate of unemployment in Antananarivo is presented in United 
Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), Situation Anal- 
ysis of the Child in Madagascar (Nairobi: UNICEF, 1984), p. 12, which is said 
to be low, since underemployment is not included. Unfortunately, no source is 
cited for their estimate. Unemployment data in Madagascar are quite fragmen- 
tary. Such data are not presented in the 1966 census, and the claim by 
Madagascar, Institut national de la statistique et de la recherche 6conomique 
(INSRE), Recensement 1975, sdrie itudes et analyse: Analyse de donnies 
socio-dconomiques, milieu urbain (Antananarivo: INSRE, n.d.), p. 17, of an 
urban unemployment of only 15,090 seems highly underestimated, since it is 
little higher than those registered as looking for work in that year. 
17. Using data from tables I-4 and I-9 from "MalaWi HS" and employing 
graphical interpolation methods, it appears that families in the fortieth percen- 
tile had an annual income of roughly MK 70.5 in 1968/69 (MK = Mala i 
Kwacha). In 1984/85, this income corresponded in real terms to an annual 
income of MK 333, which was roughly the income of a family in the sixtieth 
percentile. Using data from tables I-4 and I-8 from "Madagascar HS" (esti- 
mate A), it appears that in 1962 families in the fortieth percentile had an annual 
income of roughly FMG 47,400 (Malagasy Francs). In 1980 this income corre- 
sponded in real terms to an annual income of about FMG 146,400, which was 
roughly the income of a family in the forty-fifth percentile. The estimates for 
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both countries are particularly sensitive to the assumptions made in calculating 
changes in average incomes of smallholders. Given the rough nature of the 
data, it is best to use caution in interpreting these quantitative results in a 
qualitative fashion. 
18. For instance, I found no evidence in MalaWi of groups of people living 
on the food at the garbage dumps, a phenomenon described in vivid detail for 
Madagascar by Martine Camacho, Les poubelles de la survie: La dicharge 
municipale de Tananarive (Paris: l'Harmattan, 1986). The quantitative extent 
of the poverty problem is difficult to determine in either country, since neither 
the Mala ii nor the Malagasy governments have published any extensive stud- 
ies on the subject. Mala ii has no "official" poverty limit and in my interview 
with him, President Banda quickly dismissed the suggestion that poverty in his 
nation had increased (Mala ii, April 22, 1987). The Malagasy government is 
more conscious of the problem, particularly for the urban areas, and has tried 
to gain some idea of its magnitude. Unfortunately, the government does not 
appear to have followed a consistent approach and calculations of the level of 
"absolute poverty" for a family have varied over the'years from about FMG 
24,000 to FMG 54,000 per month (in constant 1985 FMG). More specifically, 
for a family of two persons this limit (current prices) was FMG 13,000 and 
FMG 28,000 per month in 1981 and 1985, respectively. (Madagascar, Ministbre 
des travaux publics, Schema directeur du grand Antananarivo: Projet de rap- 
port final de synthise, Project MAG 82/011 [Antananarivo: Ministbre des 
travaux publics, 1985]). A different monthly poverty line declared the level to 
be FMG 9,317 in 1971; FMG 13,658 in 1975; and FMG 15,000 in 1977. 
(Madagascar, Direction g6n6rale au plan, Revenues des minages urbains et 
satisfaction des besoins fondamentaux d Madagascar, Etudes techniques du 
plan, no. 22 [Antananarivo: Direction g6n6rale au plan, 1979]). An interesting 
qualitative discussion of poverty in Madagascar is by Jean Claude Rouveyran, 
La logique des agricultures de transition (Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 1972). 
19. These data on infant mortality come from "Mala i HS," table J-5. 
Mala i, Statistical Organization, Mala~ti Family Formation Survey, 1984 
(Zomba: Government Printer, 1987), places the infant mortality in 1983 at 154 
per thousand. 
20. Various estimates of infant mortality, including my own, are discussed 
in much more detail in "Madagascar HS," sec. J. Some data on rising mortal- 
ity, fetal, and neonatal mortality from 1978 through 1984 are presented by 
World Bank, "Madagascar: Population and Health Sector Review," Report 
no. 6446-MAG (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1986), app. 2. Some annual 
data, which refer to the number of malnourished children, can be found in 
C61lestine Rabemiafala, Contribution d evaluation de l'dtat nutritionnel des 
enfants malagasy de moins de 6 ans d travers le complexe materno-infantile de 
Tsaralalana (Ville d'Antananarivo) (These, Doctorat de medicine, Universit6 
de Madagascar, Antananarivo, 1984), p. 445. 
21. The MalaWi data come from Mala i, Minister of Health, World 
Health Organization (WHO), and UNICEF, Report of the Joint Program Re- 
view of Maternal and Child Health (Lilongwe: Minister of Health, WHO, and 
UNICEF, 1986), p. 46. The Madagascar data come from WHO, Study of the 
Epidemiological Aspects of Breast-Feeding in Madagascar, Project 62/ 
MAFA/WHO, Preliminary Report (Antananarivo: WHO, n.d.). The statistics 
reported in these two sources are considerably higher than those reported by 
UNICEF, The State of the World's Children 1986 (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1986)-12% for Mala i, 10% for Madagascar. 
22. The discussion of measurements of undernutrition in this section is 
based on Charlotte G. Neumann, "Reference Data," in Derrick B. Jelliffe and 
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E. F. Patrice Jelliffe, eds., Human Nutrition: A Comprehensive Treatise (New 
York: Plenum, 1979), pp. 299-327; and Derrick B. Jelliffe, Assessment of 
Nutritional Status of the Community, Monograph vol. 53 (Geneva: WHO, 
1966); and conversations with Nancy Binkin (Swarthmore, Pa., 1988), nutri- 
tion specialist of the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta, Georgia. By 
restricting the sample to children under five, the influence of racial factors is 
minimized; most well-nourished children in all countries have the same age 
specific height-weight patterns until their sixtieth month, a hypothesis explic- 
itly confirmed in a special study of Mala ji (unfortunately no such study is 
available for Madagascar). More specifically, Beatrice Mary Chimwaza, 
"Food and Nutrition in MalaWi" (Ph.D. thesis, Faculty of Science, University 
of London, 1982) made anthropometric measurements on children in a rural 
area (Dowa) and in a middle-class urban area (Lilongwe) and concluded 
from the latter sample: "For height, weight, and arm circumference, the 
results obtained in the present study seem to indicate that the interna- 
tional standards used are appropriate for assessing growth of the MalatCian 
children" (p. 229). To my knowledge no similar study has been made in 
Madagascar, which is racially quite different from MalaWi. However, my con- 
versation with specialists in Madagascar on this question did not reveal any 
indication that international norms were inappropriate. 
23. A special problem arises in the estimates for MalaWi n that they do 
not use an international standard but, rather, a norm based on the Mala i 
median in order to take racial differences into account; however, if less than 
50% (which seems to be the case) of the nation's children are undernourished, 
this is an appropriate procedure. 
24. These data are reported in "Mala i HS" (n. 1 above), table J-3. 
25. For Mala i, certain data on the weight/age ratios of children are avail- 
able from 1970 through 1984 and are cited by Louis A. H. Msukwa, "Agricul- 
tural Development and Undernutrition: The Case of MalaW'i" (paper presented 
at the second annual conference on Food Security Research in Southern Af- 
rica, Harare, November 1986). Although interesting, such data are not 
sufficiently comparable for trends to be discerned. The same may be said for 
the nutrition data presented in "MalaWi HS," table J-3. 
26. Such data were shown to me by officials of the Catholic Relief Service 
in Antananarivo. Certain Malagasy officials who have opposed the structural 
adjustment program have also argued that an increase in general poverty has 
occurred because the average household size increased from 1975 to 1985, thus 
indicating a doubling up of families. However, the available data suggest that 
the average household size was about the same in both 1966 and 1985; 
Madagascar, INSRE, Recensement 1975, Sirie itudes et analyse: Les md- 
nages (Antananarivo: INSRE, n.d.) p. 7, suggests that the ostensible fall in 
average household size in 1975 was a statistical artifact, due to the fact that the 
question of household size was posed somewhat differently than in 1966. 
Therefore, the alleged rise in household size between 1975 and 1985 is probably 
a statistical artifact as well. 
27. Simon Kuznets, "Economic Growth and Income Inequality," Ameri- 
can Economic Review 45 (March 1955): 1-28. 
28. For instance, the study by E. Wayne Nafziger, Inequality in Africa: 
Political Elites, Proletariat, Peasants and the Poor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988). 
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